At that recovery rate, almost 80% of the loans in a CLO could default and still leave the AAA-rated note unimpaired. And economic health cannot be restored until people feel safe going about their daily business. This article appears in the July/August 2020 print edition. How can these banks justify gambling so much money on what looks like such a risky bet? So while the banks restrict their CLO investments mostly to AAA‑rated layers, what they really own is exposure to tens of billions of dollars of high-risk debt. These are loans made to companies that have maxed out their borrowing and can no longer sell bonds directly to investors or qualify for a traditional bank loan.

Just as easy mortgages fueled economic growth in the 2000s, cheap corporate debt has done so in the past decade, and many companies have binged on it. If the leveraged-loan market imploded, their liabilities could quickly become greater than their assets.

And then, sometime in the next year, we will all stare into the financial abyss. A bank shouldn’t be able to keep $1 trillion worth of assets off its books. For the moment, the financial system seems relatively stable. In those highly rated CLOs, you won’t find a single loan rated AAA, AA, or even A. At that point, we will be well beyond the scope of the previous recession, and we will have either exhausted the remedies that spared the system last time or found that they won’t work this time around. Second lien loan recovery rate is for the period 1/1/2008 to 6/01/2020. This one could be worse. Under the new rules, banks were supposed to borrow less, make fewer long-shot bets, and be more transparent about their holdings. And some of the most irresponsible gambles from the last crisis—the speculative derivatives and credit-default swaps you may remember reading about in 2008—are less common today, experts told me. All of that happened last time, too. If the defaults increase, the bottom layer will lose even more, and the pain will start to work its way up the layers. That’s because the banks mostly own the least risky, top layer of CLOs.

But not this, Jim Cramer on Chesapeake Energy filing for bankruptcy. What, precisely, is the worst-case scenario? As reported by the SEC, there are 68 active interval funds offering unique access to less liquid investments including real estate, mortgage-backed securities, corporate debt, and structured products. That alone should scare us all—and inform the way we think about the next year and beyond. Related video: The Fed's fight against another financial crisis (provided by CNBC), How you can save $1 million for retirement, How much the most populous states pay mail carriers, Creepy ways your company can spy on you while you work from home, Major companies suspend social media advertising over online hate speech, This bookshop survived earthquakes and recessions. These companies borrow to finance acquisitions and grow their businesses. Just because you’re working from home doesn’t mean your boss can’t keep tabs on your every move. But recall that the previous crash took more than a year to unfold.

Meanwhile, the same economic forces buffeting CLOs will hit other parts of the banks’ balance sheets hard; as the recession drags on, their traditional sources of revenue will also dry up. Of course, many Americans suffered as a result of the crash, losing homes, jobs, and wealth. The Federal Reserve will try to arrange a bank bailout. According to J.P. Morgan, CLO loan recoveries average 65.6% of the loan amount, significantly higher than senior unsecured bonds (high yield) or second lien loans. The banks themselves may reveal that their CLO investments are larger than was previously understood. As of mid-May, no such loans had been made.) The two securities are remarkably alike. The bottom layer is the riskiest, the top the safest. It is a massive number. You may think that such a crisis is unlikely, with memories of the 2008 crash still so fresh.

The Financial Stability Board, which monitors the global financial system, warned in December that 14 percent of CLOs—more than $100 billion worth—are unaccounted for. Microsoft may earn an Affiliate Commission if you purchase something through recommended links in this article.

The answer is “default correlation,” a measure of the likelihood of loans defaulting at the same time.

These are investments a bank plans to sell at some point, though not necessarily right away. Capital Management and ING Capital Advisors. To prevent the next crisis, Congress in 2010 passed the Dodd-Frank Act. The loans were spread across the entire country and among many lenders.

A couple of midsize banks—Banc of California, Stifel Financial—have CLOs totaling more than 100 percent of their capital. But there’s another threat to the economy, too.
Flat Rock Global, LLC is an alternative asset manager.

But this time, the bailout proposal will likely face stiffer opposition, from both parties. The financial sector isn’t like other sectors.

How can the credit-rating agencies get away with this? Later this summer, leveraged-loan defaults will increase significantly as the economic effects of the pandemic fully register. The Federal Reserve began conducting “stress tests” to keep the banks in line. After the housing crisis, subprime CDOs naturally fell out of favor. But they are also emblematic of other complex and artificial products that banks have stashed on—and off—their balance sheets. Like us on Facebook to see similar stories, The concerted campaign that got public health experts to declare racist policing a crisis, British supermarket chain launches frozen chicken nugget into space to celebrate anniversary, The Fed's fight against Covid-19 and another financial crisis. The chart below shows the current makeup of these active interval funds, which total $33.5 billion in net assets. Many of those CDOs, featured in the book, The Big Short by Michael Lewis, were backed by subprime mortgages of dubious quality, not first lien corporate loans. If just a few of the loans in a CLO default, the bottom layer will suffer a loss and the other layers will remain safe. Defenders of CLOs say they aren’t, in fact, a gamble—on the contrary, they are as sure a thing as you can hope for. A CLO walks and talks like a CDO, but in place of loans made to home buyers are loans made to businesses—specifically, troubled businesses. What I’m about to describe is necessarily speculative, but it is rooted in the experience of the previous crash and in what we know about current bank holdings. The credit-rating agencies grade CLOs and their underlying debt separately. The big banks settle for smaller returns and the security of the top layer. To understand if CLO AAA-rated notes pose a risk to the banking system, we can look back to the historical performance of CLOs including during the Great Financial Crisis (“GFC”) of 2008-2009. Yet by March 2009, the economy was on the upswing, and the longest bull market in history had begun. Without reliable credit, many Americans might struggle to pay for their daily needs. This is why, in 2008, then–Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson went so far as to get down on one knee to beg Nancy Pelosi for her help sparing the system. The federal government stepped in to rescue the other big banks and forestall a panic. Last July, one month after Powell declared in a press conference that “the risk isn’t in the banks,” two economists from the Federal Reserve reported that U.S. depository institutions and their holding companies owned more than $110 billion worth of CLOs issued out of the Cayman Islands alone. The top layer, however, remains protected: It loses money only after the lower layers have been wiped out.

Remember: CLOs are made up of loans to businesses that are already in trouble.

The reforms were well intentioned, but, as we’ll see, they haven’t kept the banks from falling back into old, bad habits.
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At that recovery rate, almost 80% of the loans in a CLO could default and still leave the AAA-rated note unimpaired. And economic health cannot be restored until people feel safe going about their daily business. This article appears in the July/August 2020 print edition. How can these banks justify gambling so much money on what looks like such a risky bet? So while the banks restrict their CLO investments mostly to AAA‑rated layers, what they really own is exposure to tens of billions of dollars of high-risk debt. These are loans made to companies that have maxed out their borrowing and can no longer sell bonds directly to investors or qualify for a traditional bank loan.

Just as easy mortgages fueled economic growth in the 2000s, cheap corporate debt has done so in the past decade, and many companies have binged on it. If the leveraged-loan market imploded, their liabilities could quickly become greater than their assets.

And then, sometime in the next year, we will all stare into the financial abyss. A bank shouldn’t be able to keep $1 trillion worth of assets off its books. For the moment, the financial system seems relatively stable. In those highly rated CLOs, you won’t find a single loan rated AAA, AA, or even A. At that point, we will be well beyond the scope of the previous recession, and we will have either exhausted the remedies that spared the system last time or found that they won’t work this time around. Second lien loan recovery rate is for the period 1/1/2008 to 6/01/2020. This one could be worse. Under the new rules, banks were supposed to borrow less, make fewer long-shot bets, and be more transparent about their holdings. And some of the most irresponsible gambles from the last crisis—the speculative derivatives and credit-default swaps you may remember reading about in 2008—are less common today, experts told me. All of that happened last time, too. If the defaults increase, the bottom layer will lose even more, and the pain will start to work its way up the layers. That’s because the banks mostly own the least risky, top layer of CLOs.

But not this, Jim Cramer on Chesapeake Energy filing for bankruptcy. What, precisely, is the worst-case scenario? As reported by the SEC, there are 68 active interval funds offering unique access to less liquid investments including real estate, mortgage-backed securities, corporate debt, and structured products. That alone should scare us all—and inform the way we think about the next year and beyond. Related video: The Fed's fight against another financial crisis (provided by CNBC), How you can save $1 million for retirement, How much the most populous states pay mail carriers, Creepy ways your company can spy on you while you work from home, Major companies suspend social media advertising over online hate speech, This bookshop survived earthquakes and recessions. These companies borrow to finance acquisitions and grow their businesses. Just because you’re working from home doesn’t mean your boss can’t keep tabs on your every move. But recall that the previous crash took more than a year to unfold.

Meanwhile, the same economic forces buffeting CLOs will hit other parts of the banks’ balance sheets hard; as the recession drags on, their traditional sources of revenue will also dry up. Of course, many Americans suffered as a result of the crash, losing homes, jobs, and wealth. The Federal Reserve will try to arrange a bank bailout. According to J.P. Morgan, CLO loan recoveries average 65.6% of the loan amount, significantly higher than senior unsecured bonds (high yield) or second lien loans. The banks themselves may reveal that their CLO investments are larger than was previously understood. As of mid-May, no such loans had been made.) The two securities are remarkably alike. The bottom layer is the riskiest, the top the safest. It is a massive number. You may think that such a crisis is unlikely, with memories of the 2008 crash still so fresh.

The Financial Stability Board, which monitors the global financial system, warned in December that 14 percent of CLOs—more than $100 billion worth—are unaccounted for. Microsoft may earn an Affiliate Commission if you purchase something through recommended links in this article.

The answer is “default correlation,” a measure of the likelihood of loans defaulting at the same time.

These are investments a bank plans to sell at some point, though not necessarily right away. Capital Management and ING Capital Advisors. To prevent the next crisis, Congress in 2010 passed the Dodd-Frank Act. The loans were spread across the entire country and among many lenders.

A couple of midsize banks—Banc of California, Stifel Financial—have CLOs totaling more than 100 percent of their capital. But there’s another threat to the economy, too.
Flat Rock Global, LLC is an alternative asset manager.

But this time, the bailout proposal will likely face stiffer opposition, from both parties. The financial sector isn’t like other sectors.

How can the credit-rating agencies get away with this? Later this summer, leveraged-loan defaults will increase significantly as the economic effects of the pandemic fully register. The Federal Reserve began conducting “stress tests” to keep the banks in line. After the housing crisis, subprime CDOs naturally fell out of favor. But they are also emblematic of other complex and artificial products that banks have stashed on—and off—their balance sheets. Like us on Facebook to see similar stories, The concerted campaign that got public health experts to declare racist policing a crisis, British supermarket chain launches frozen chicken nugget into space to celebrate anniversary, The Fed's fight against Covid-19 and another financial crisis. The chart below shows the current makeup of these active interval funds, which total $33.5 billion in net assets. Many of those CDOs, featured in the book, The Big Short by Michael Lewis, were backed by subprime mortgages of dubious quality, not first lien corporate loans. If just a few of the loans in a CLO default, the bottom layer will suffer a loss and the other layers will remain safe. Defenders of CLOs say they aren’t, in fact, a gamble—on the contrary, they are as sure a thing as you can hope for. A CLO walks and talks like a CDO, but in place of loans made to home buyers are loans made to businesses—specifically, troubled businesses. What I’m about to describe is necessarily speculative, but it is rooted in the experience of the previous crash and in what we know about current bank holdings. The credit-rating agencies grade CLOs and their underlying debt separately. The big banks settle for smaller returns and the security of the top layer. To understand if CLO AAA-rated notes pose a risk to the banking system, we can look back to the historical performance of CLOs including during the Great Financial Crisis (“GFC”) of 2008-2009. Yet by March 2009, the economy was on the upswing, and the longest bull market in history had begun. Without reliable credit, many Americans might struggle to pay for their daily needs. This is why, in 2008, then–Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson went so far as to get down on one knee to beg Nancy Pelosi for her help sparing the system. The federal government stepped in to rescue the other big banks and forestall a panic. Last July, one month after Powell declared in a press conference that “the risk isn’t in the banks,” two economists from the Federal Reserve reported that U.S. depository institutions and their holding companies owned more than $110 billion worth of CLOs issued out of the Cayman Islands alone. The top layer, however, remains protected: It loses money only after the lower layers have been wiped out.

Remember: CLOs are made up of loans to businesses that are already in trouble.

The reforms were well intentioned, but, as we’ll see, they haven’t kept the banks from falling back into old, bad habits.
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20 Oct

frank partnoy clo


Now moviegoing and party-throwing are paused indefinitely—and may never come back to their pre-pandemic levels. Citigroup reported $20 billion worth of CLOs as of March 31; JPMorgan Chase reported $35 billion (along with an unrealized loss on CLOs of $2 billion). Yields for CLO AAA-rated notes have increased from pre-Coronavirus levels of ~1.6% to ~2.0% today.
In late 2007, banks began disclosing tens of billions of dollars of subprime-CDO losses. Since the GFC, the structures of CLOs have become more debt friendly, with shorter CLO reinvestment periods, higher debt costs, more equity subordination and stricter limitations on the types of securities that can be included in the CLO. For some, the erosion of capital could approach the levels Lehman Brothers and Citigroup suffered in 2008. It appears that equity investors feel far more confident in an economic recovery than leveraged debt investors. If 10 percent of a CLO’s loans default, the bottom layers will suffer, but if you own the top layer, you might not even notice. First lien loan recovery is for the period 1/1/1990 to 6/01/2020. And it is inside the bank. Some members of Congress will question whether the Federal Reserve has the authority to buy risky investments to prop up the financial sector, as it did in 2008.

Hundreds of billions of dollars in loans to home buyers were repackaged into securities called collateralized debt obligations, known as CDOs.

The next year, Lehman Brothers went under, taking the economy with it.

While many asset classes have been negatively affected by Coronavirus, the case made by the author is far from compelling. We are not in the midst of a conventional downturn. The total is $29.7 billion. But it seemed unlikely that many of them would default at the same time. The intervention worked—though its success did not seem assured at the time—and the system righted itself.

What then? I ran my finger across the page to see the total for these investments, investments that Powell and Mnuchin have asserted are “outside the banking system.”. If just a few of the loans in a CLO default, the bottom layer will suffer a loss and the other layers will remain safe. How many CLO AAAs defaulted during the GFC? I often think of a CLO as a simplified bank, as shown below: CLOs are securitizations that have rules which allocate principal and interest among different classes of investors, with AAA investors first in line for cash flows from the CLO’s loans, followed by other CLO investors with subordinated positions. https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/the-worst-worst-case/ar-BB15hOXd That might not sound bad, but B-rated debt is lousy debt. Several experts told me they expect more record-breaking months this summer. Under current conditions, the outlook for leveraged loans in a range of industries is truly grim. He understood the alternative. You can perhaps guess much of the rest: At some point, rumors will circulate that one major bank is near collapse.

Show full articles without "Continue Reading" button for {0} hours.

At that recovery rate, almost 80% of the loans in a CLO could default and still leave the AAA-rated note unimpaired. And economic health cannot be restored until people feel safe going about their daily business. This article appears in the July/August 2020 print edition. How can these banks justify gambling so much money on what looks like such a risky bet? So while the banks restrict their CLO investments mostly to AAA‑rated layers, what they really own is exposure to tens of billions of dollars of high-risk debt. These are loans made to companies that have maxed out their borrowing and can no longer sell bonds directly to investors or qualify for a traditional bank loan.

Just as easy mortgages fueled economic growth in the 2000s, cheap corporate debt has done so in the past decade, and many companies have binged on it. If the leveraged-loan market imploded, their liabilities could quickly become greater than their assets.

And then, sometime in the next year, we will all stare into the financial abyss. A bank shouldn’t be able to keep $1 trillion worth of assets off its books. For the moment, the financial system seems relatively stable. In those highly rated CLOs, you won’t find a single loan rated AAA, AA, or even A. At that point, we will be well beyond the scope of the previous recession, and we will have either exhausted the remedies that spared the system last time or found that they won’t work this time around. Second lien loan recovery rate is for the period 1/1/2008 to 6/01/2020. This one could be worse. Under the new rules, banks were supposed to borrow less, make fewer long-shot bets, and be more transparent about their holdings. And some of the most irresponsible gambles from the last crisis—the speculative derivatives and credit-default swaps you may remember reading about in 2008—are less common today, experts told me. All of that happened last time, too. If the defaults increase, the bottom layer will lose even more, and the pain will start to work its way up the layers. That’s because the banks mostly own the least risky, top layer of CLOs.

But not this, Jim Cramer on Chesapeake Energy filing for bankruptcy. What, precisely, is the worst-case scenario? As reported by the SEC, there are 68 active interval funds offering unique access to less liquid investments including real estate, mortgage-backed securities, corporate debt, and structured products. That alone should scare us all—and inform the way we think about the next year and beyond. Related video: The Fed's fight against another financial crisis (provided by CNBC), How you can save $1 million for retirement, How much the most populous states pay mail carriers, Creepy ways your company can spy on you while you work from home, Major companies suspend social media advertising over online hate speech, This bookshop survived earthquakes and recessions. These companies borrow to finance acquisitions and grow their businesses. Just because you’re working from home doesn’t mean your boss can’t keep tabs on your every move. But recall that the previous crash took more than a year to unfold.

Meanwhile, the same economic forces buffeting CLOs will hit other parts of the banks’ balance sheets hard; as the recession drags on, their traditional sources of revenue will also dry up. Of course, many Americans suffered as a result of the crash, losing homes, jobs, and wealth. The Federal Reserve will try to arrange a bank bailout. According to J.P. Morgan, CLO loan recoveries average 65.6% of the loan amount, significantly higher than senior unsecured bonds (high yield) or second lien loans. The banks themselves may reveal that their CLO investments are larger than was previously understood. As of mid-May, no such loans had been made.) The two securities are remarkably alike. The bottom layer is the riskiest, the top the safest. It is a massive number. You may think that such a crisis is unlikely, with memories of the 2008 crash still so fresh.

The Financial Stability Board, which monitors the global financial system, warned in December that 14 percent of CLOs—more than $100 billion worth—are unaccounted for. Microsoft may earn an Affiliate Commission if you purchase something through recommended links in this article.

The answer is “default correlation,” a measure of the likelihood of loans defaulting at the same time.

These are investments a bank plans to sell at some point, though not necessarily right away. Capital Management and ING Capital Advisors. To prevent the next crisis, Congress in 2010 passed the Dodd-Frank Act. The loans were spread across the entire country and among many lenders.

A couple of midsize banks—Banc of California, Stifel Financial—have CLOs totaling more than 100 percent of their capital. But there’s another threat to the economy, too.
Flat Rock Global, LLC is an alternative asset manager.

But this time, the bailout proposal will likely face stiffer opposition, from both parties. The financial sector isn’t like other sectors.

How can the credit-rating agencies get away with this? Later this summer, leveraged-loan defaults will increase significantly as the economic effects of the pandemic fully register. The Federal Reserve began conducting “stress tests” to keep the banks in line. After the housing crisis, subprime CDOs naturally fell out of favor. But they are also emblematic of other complex and artificial products that banks have stashed on—and off—their balance sheets. Like us on Facebook to see similar stories, The concerted campaign that got public health experts to declare racist policing a crisis, British supermarket chain launches frozen chicken nugget into space to celebrate anniversary, The Fed's fight against Covid-19 and another financial crisis. The chart below shows the current makeup of these active interval funds, which total $33.5 billion in net assets. Many of those CDOs, featured in the book, The Big Short by Michael Lewis, were backed by subprime mortgages of dubious quality, not first lien corporate loans. If just a few of the loans in a CLO default, the bottom layer will suffer a loss and the other layers will remain safe. Defenders of CLOs say they aren’t, in fact, a gamble—on the contrary, they are as sure a thing as you can hope for. A CLO walks and talks like a CDO, but in place of loans made to home buyers are loans made to businesses—specifically, troubled businesses. What I’m about to describe is necessarily speculative, but it is rooted in the experience of the previous crash and in what we know about current bank holdings. The credit-rating agencies grade CLOs and their underlying debt separately. The big banks settle for smaller returns and the security of the top layer. To understand if CLO AAA-rated notes pose a risk to the banking system, we can look back to the historical performance of CLOs including during the Great Financial Crisis (“GFC”) of 2008-2009. Yet by March 2009, the economy was on the upswing, and the longest bull market in history had begun. Without reliable credit, many Americans might struggle to pay for their daily needs. This is why, in 2008, then–Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson went so far as to get down on one knee to beg Nancy Pelosi for her help sparing the system. The federal government stepped in to rescue the other big banks and forestall a panic. Last July, one month after Powell declared in a press conference that “the risk isn’t in the banks,” two economists from the Federal Reserve reported that U.S. depository institutions and their holding companies owned more than $110 billion worth of CLOs issued out of the Cayman Islands alone. The top layer, however, remains protected: It loses money only after the lower layers have been wiped out.

Remember: CLOs are made up of loans to businesses that are already in trouble.

The reforms were well intentioned, but, as we’ll see, they haven’t kept the banks from falling back into old, bad habits.

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